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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE EVENTS OF September 11, 2001 defy modern eco-
nomic and management theory when addressed in aviation
terms. These theories would suggest that, once the impact of
such events has lessened, and economies are restored to their
status quo ante, a rise in the gross domestic product of States to
earlier levels would almost inevitably result in increased con-
sumption and restoration of the business. The natural assump-
tion would be that the demand for air travel would rise to earlier
proportions and consumption in terms of air transport services
would be restored to normalcy. However, the September 11 at-
tacks introduced a unique characteristic through the fear factor
that directly impacts the future development of air transport. As
a result, the grim task of restoring passenger confidence stands
in the way of the economic revival of the air transport industry.
* The author, who is a senior official at the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), has written this article in his personal capacity.
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Returning passenger confidence to previous levels is also critical
to aviation crisis management.
In re-establishing confidence in air transport services, aviation
management should essentially target three disciplines: com-
mercial, insurance, and security. Risk management measures
have already been taken by States. These measures include of-
fering indemnities and guarantees toward air carriers' third
party war risk liability, and initiating action on aviation security
and insurance worldwide. These measures should form the
starting point of a sustained and integrated management pro-
gram requiring considerable financial and human resources in-
vestment. In order to assess the requirements for such an
investment, and to justify it, a carefully considered study of the
magnitude of the crises involved in aviation has to be under-
taken by States.
Aviation has been in constant crisis. The air transport indus-
try, even prior to September 11, although seemingly a glamor-
ous, exciting, and prosperous business, never enjoyed sustained
periods of profitability. Even among the large carriers, a short
bout of profitability would inevitably be followed by a period of
downturn in real income. There is nothing arcane about this
situation. It is simply that this fluctuation in fortune is an ine-
luctable characteristic of air transport, whose fortunes are dic-
tated by rigid regulation, competition, and technological
change. For this reason, it would be doing the air transport in-
dustry an injustice if an analysis of the situation it faces should
be strictly bifurcated into pre- and post- September 2001 seg-
ments. However, this by no means suggests that the tragic
events of September 11 did not gravely aggravate the fortunes of
an industry already operating at a disadvantage. The events of
September 11 placed issues in a strictly realistic perspective,
making one conclude that, if a sustained analysis were to be
made of air transport, plain economic theory would no longer
be the exclusive discipline for consideration. Rather, all rele-
vant factors would have to be taken in context, and emerging
issues would have to be analysed as possible threats to the eco-
nomic well-being of the air transport industry.
Any study of investment in present day aviation management
incontrovertibly involves viewing issues from both an economic
and legal perspective. In the field of aviation security, these two
disciplines are intertwined with the regulatory regime, calling
for a wide discussion of legal and regulatory schemes in the role
played by States in ensuring security in aviation within their ter-
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ritories. The importance of economic issues can be viewed as
predominant in the field of insurance, particularly in the in-
quiry as to whether States should be establishing an aviation re-
insurance pool to support airlines in crisis, thus giving States
much more control over the running of their national airlines.
Therefore, in an overall sense, the question arises as to whether
increased State involvement in both security and insurance is-
sues would not bring back rigid State control over national carri-
ers. If this question were to be answered in the affirmative and
day-to-day State control makes a comeback, one would have to
inquire into the continued validity of gradual liberalization of
market access, bringing the commercial angle into play and
forming an interlinked triangle. If this phenomenon were to
occur, the necessary corollary would inevitably emerge; that is
whether absolute competition would no longer be a collective
goal among States, and whether the need for added capacity
would no longer arise in the volumes earlier required.
This article will primarily address issues in a post-September
2001 context, particularly with regard to the need for invest-
ment in order to revive a flagging aviation industry. It will also
analyze issues past and present, with the intent of looking at the
future. This will be attempted by considering three major areas,
which were already in crisis but were further impacted by the
events of September 2001. These areas relate to crises in the
commercial, security, and insurance fields. It will also view the
overall management philosophy of an aviation industry in crisis -
comprising air transport and other aviation related industries -
through issues that continue to impact the economic viability of
air transport, particularly as a result of the events of September
11, 2001. These analyses will be carried out with a view toward
assessing the quality of investment required for reviving the avia-
tion industry.
II. AERONAUTICAL IMPLICATIONS
It is an incontrovertible fact that the events of September 11,
2001 primarily impacted the victims of those terrible attacks and
their families. It is equally unchallengeable that the second cas-
ualty in this horrendous series of events was the aviation industry
in general. The aviation industry paid the irrecoverable cost of
having aircraft used as weapons of vast destruction. Commer-
cially speaking, the closure of airspace, as an immediate mea-
sure throughout the United States and some parts of Europe,
and its subsequent opening amidst restricted commercial activ-
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ity of airlines, not only impacted the air transport industry dur-
ing the first few days of the catastrophe, but also continues to
portend grave commercial implications for the airline industry
in the years to come.
The International Civil Aviation Conference, convened at the
initiative of President Roosevelt of the United States, was held in
Chicago, Illinois in November and December 1944. The resul-
tant consensus, the Convention on International Civil Aviation,'
begins by stating in its Preamble that the "development of inter-
national civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve
friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples
of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general
security. "2
The Chicago Convention identifies its scope as being applica-
ble to international civil aviation, thus leaving one with the as-
sumption that, at least technically, the Convention may not
apply to local or domestic aviation.' If this were to be accepted
without further debate, one could argue that the attacks on the
United States, carried out with aircraft flying domestic routes
within the Country, would not come within the purview of the
Chicago Convention. The situation, however, is not that simple
or straightforward. The Chicago Convention does not state any-
where that it will apply only to international civil aviation. On
the contrary, the Convention, in Article 4, provides: "Each Con-
tracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. 4
Although the provision itself is contextually irrelevant to the
events of September 11, 2001, the use of the words "civil avia-
tion" links domestic and local aviation to the Chicago Conven-
tion and therefore to the work of the international aviation
community, in pursuing safe and orderly development of inter-
national civil aviation.
The ICAO Council, at its 141st Session in 1994, addressed the
subject of aircraft accident investigation. The Council noted
that Article 26 of the Chicago Convention, requires a State to
institute investigations upon an aircraft of another State which
meets with an accident in the territory of the first State.5 The
I Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter "Chicago Convention"].
2 Id. at preamble.
3 Id.
4 Id. at art. 4.
5 Id. at art. 26.
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Council further noted that while Article 26 seemingly describes
accidents occurring during international air transport, the Fore-
word to Annex 13 specifies that the Annex may also deal with
accidents of a kind which do not fall within the purview of Arti-
cle 26.6 Accordingly, in 1944 the Council considered an amend-
ment to the Annex, which ensured some uniformity in
investigation procedures regardless of whether an accident in-
volved an international or domestic flight.
Annex 13 has incorporated the abovementioned amendment
by stating in its Foreword:
Article 26 does not preclude the taking of further action in the
field of aircraft accident investigation and the procedures set
forth in this Annex are not limited solely to an inquiry instituted
under the requirements of Article 26, but under prescribed cir-
cumstances apply in the event of an inquiry into any "aircraft ac-
cident" within the terms of the definition herein.7
The Annex defines an "accident" as "an occurrence associated
with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight
until such time as all such persons have disembarked."8 The
definition does not mention that the accident has to occur dur-
ing an international flight.
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, on the subject of avia-
tion security, defines "security" as "a combination of measures
and human and material resources intended to safeguard inter-
national civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference."'
This would mean that any measure taken, following the occur-
rence of an accident caused as a result of domestic aviation
would fall within the provisions of Annex 17.
III. WAR RISK MANAGEMENT
The international insurance market gave notice on Septem-
ber 17 that, effective September 24, third-party war risk liability
insurance, covering airline operators and other service provid-
ers against losses and damages resulting from war, hijacking and
6 Id; see also Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Annex 13 to the Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation, at v (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter "Annex
13"].
7 Annex 13, supra note 6, at v.
8 Id. at 1-1.
9 Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference, Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, at 1-1
(7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter "Annex 17"].
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other perils, would be cancelled. Underwriters subsequently re-
instated partial coverage for war risks with drastically reduced
limits at considerably higher premiums. As an immediate re-
sponse to this measure, the President of the Council of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Dr. Assad
Kotaite, issued a State Letter to all ICAO Contracting States, re-
questing that they take effective measures to preclude aviation
and air transport services from coming to a standstill. This letter
also appealed to Contracting States to support airline operators
and other relevant parties, at least until the insurance market
stabilized, by committing themselves to cover any risks to which
airline operators and others may become exposed by the cancel-
lation of insurance coverage.'0
The 33rd Session of the ICAO Assembly, held in Montreal
from September 25 to October 5, 2001, considered as an urgent
priority the insurance issue by adopting Resolution A33-20.11
The Resolution, while recognizing that the tragic events of Sep-
tember 2001 have adversely affected the availability of war-risk
insurance coverage to the operations of airline operators glob-
ally, urged Contracting States "to work together to develop a
more enduring and coordinated approach to the important
problem of providing assistance to airline operators and other
service providers." 12 The Resolution, basing itself on the funda-
mental premise enunciated in Article 44 of the Chicago Conven-
tion, which refers to the objective of ICAO to ensure safe,
regular, efficient and economical air transport, directs the
Council of ICAO to urgently establish a Special Group to con-
sider the issues emerging from action taken in the insurance
market regarding third party war risk insurance coverage.13
One must of course appreciate that war and associated risks,
including hijacking and acts of terrorism, pose an extremely
high-risk exposure to insurers. Aviation hull and liability policies
therefore usually contain an express exclusion in respect of such
risks. The war risk exclusion used in the London market, known
as AVN 48B, which was a clause introduced by the London insur-
10 State Letter EC 2/6-01 (Sept. 21, 2001), ICAO: Montreal.
11 Coordinated Approach in Providing Assistance in the Field of War Risk In-
surance, ICAO Res. A33-20 (provisional), ICAO Assembly 33rd Sess. (Sept. 25 -
Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/a33/index.html
[hereinafter "A33-20"].
12 Id.




ance market after the Israeli raid on Beirut Airport on Decem-
ber 28, 1968, applies as a war and hijacking risk exclusion
clause, and is now included in every aviation hull and liability
policy. This clause covers a wide range of eventualities includ-
ing damage caused as a result of any malicious act or act of sabo-
tage, but excludes the risks of war, invasion, hostilities, civil war,
rebellion, revolution, insurrection, martial law, hostile detona-
tion of atomic weapons, strikes, riots, civil commotions or labour
disturbances, acts of a political or terrorist nature, sabotage,
confiscation, nationalization, seizure, and hijacking. 4
In practical terms, war risk insurance is required to cover
three eventualities: to protect an airline operator from potential
financial liability that couldjeopardise its existence; tojustify op-
erations into territories of States by appeasing those States that
they and their citizens would be financially compensated in the
event of damage; and to protect the financial interests of air-
lines, their owners, financiers and lessors. It is usual for an air-
craft, depending on its type, to be covered for any amount from
US$750 million to US$1 billion on aggregate (as against per sin-
gle occurrence). Against this figure, it is significant that the un-
derwriters permitted coverage for only up to US$50 million
aggregate, consequent upon their issuing notice of withdrawal
of third party war risk insurance on September 17, 2001.
Many Contracting States, following the State Letter of the
President of the ICAO Council, stepped in to address issues re-
garding cancellation of insurance. It would therefore be rele-
vant to discuss steps taken by these various ICAO Contracting
States in responding almost immediately to the difficulties
posed to their airline operators and other service providers.
In the United States, the Bush administration proposed a plan
to have taxpayers cover most of the losses that insurance compa-
nies would suffer in future terrorist attacks. The administration
viewed its proposal as an alternative to legislation drafted by
lawmakers from both parties in Congress at the behest of the
insurance industry. The industry plan recommends a new gov-
ernment-backed insurance company that would manage a pool
of premiums and payouts for terrorism policies. Once losses ex-
ceeded the amount of money in the pool, the government
would cover the difference - which could total much more than
taxpayers stand to pay under the administration's proposal. The
administration was wary of the industry's approach, fearing the
14 Id.
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creation of a new federal bureaucracy that is insensitive to
costs. 5
The White House reportedly planned to propose that the fed-
eral government relieve insurance companies of 80 percent or
more of the cost of damages from any terrorist attacks over the
next year. The proposal would leave the government vulnerable
to huge losses if there were large-scale attacks, but administra-
tion officials said they thought it was the most workable plan at a
time when the industry and others that depend on insurance
need a quick fix.I6
Experts estimate that about 70 percent of the insurance con-
tracts covering terrorist attacks will expire by the end of the
year, and reinsurers, who essentially offer insurance to the insur-
ers, have said they plan to drop such coverage. 17
The member States of the European Union recognized that
the terrorist attacks exposed the vulnerability of the air trans-
port sector, with damages exceeding all rational estimates. The
EU Member States have asked the Commission to draw up
guidelines to ensure efficient and coherent responses in such
cases. Possible responses could include the establishment of a
"mutual fund" for risks in order to avoid the cost of national
measures. In addition, the Commission proposes harmonising
the amounts and conditions of insurance required for the issue
of operating licences.18
On October 10, 2001, the European Commission announced
that it would allow member states to help European airlines re-
cover from the turmoil after the September 11 attacks. The
Commission, which in the past has been critical of government
assistance to airlines, is now urging governments to extend com-
pensation to cover the rise in premiums until the end of the
year, and has proposed setting up a fund to cover the higher
premiums. 19
In the context of European States, it must be borne in mind
that the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) had, dur-
ing a special Plenary Meeting held in Paris on December 13,
15 See Jennifer Loven, Bush Admin. Readying Insurance Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 13, 2001).
1 Id.
17 Stephen Labaton, White House Said to Have Relief Plan for Insurers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2001, at B6.
18 Full EU Statement on Airline Aid, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2001), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/business/ 1591283.stm.
19 Id.
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2000, adopted a Resolution2 1 setting certain third-party liability
limits for airline accidents involving carriers of ECAC Member
States. The action of the European Union of October 10, 2001,
presumably would apply, at least temporarily, notwithstanding
the earlier ECAC Resolution.
Japan's government stepped in to help the struggling airline
industry as companies tried to cope with rising insurance costs
and falling demand in the aftermath of the suicide attacks on
the United States. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport said the government would guarantee third-party in-
surance up to $2 billion forJapan's airline carriers to cover any
shortfall in claims after insurers reduced coverage to $50 million
following the September 11 attacks.2 1
Colombia's airlines pleaded for government aid on October
3, 2001, after their insurance costs rose 6,300 percent to $32
million following the September 11 attacks in the United States.
Colombia's Association of Colombian Air Transporters (ATAC)
said the Andean nation was hit especially hard, since it had al-
ready faced a high premium due to its 37-year guerrilla war. Co-
lombia's government stated that it would authorize an increase
in passenger ticket prices to help offset the added costs, but did
not offer further details.22
Almost immediately after the withdrawal of coverage, Singa-
pore gave the assurance that it would extend third party war risk
liability coverage to various approved aviation service providers
for their operations in the city state. The government had ear-
lier decided to provide third party war risk liability coverage to
Singapore Airlines, SilkAir, SIA Cargo and the Civil Aviation Au-
thority of Singapore. The official statement of Singapore is re-
ported to have stated that a commercial charge would be levied
for this insurance cover, with an initial waiver for the first 30
days. 23
Royal Air Maroc (RAM)'s insurance practically quadrupled
from 28 million dirhams to 120 million dirhams since Septem-
ber 11. The government of Morocco agreed to offer RAM war
insurance guarantees following the insurance companies' deci-
20 Resolution on Minimum Level of Insurance Cover for Passenger and Third
Party Liability, Res. ECAC/25-1, European Civil Aviation Conference (Dec. 13,
2000), at http://www.ecac-ceac.org/uk/documents/prl67e.pdf.
21 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
22 SeeJavier Mozzo, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2001) (on file with author).
23 See REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
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sion to cap airlines' third-party war and terrorism insurance at
$50 million in the expectation of potential record payouts.
Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department on October 4, 2001
gave the green light for fifteen airlines to levy insurance
surcharges on passengers on Hong Kong Routes. The fifteen air-
lines that have secured approval from the Civil Aviation Depart-
ment to impose insurance surcharges include the two locally
based passenger carriers - Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd and Hong
Kong Dragon Airlines ("Dragonair") Ltd.
Given below is a table of the fifteen airlines and the proposed
surcharges.
Airlines Proposed Insurance Surcharges
Cathay Pacific US$4 per flight coupon
Dragonair US$4 per air segment
Asiana Airlines US$1.25 per sector
KLM Royal Dutch US$5 per ticket coupon
Gulf Air US$5 per sector
Singapore Airlines US$1.25 per sector
Emirates Airline HK$39 per sector
Philippine Airline US$6 per sector
Thai Airway Intl US$1.25 per flight coupon
Korean Air HK$10 per flight sector
Myanmar Airway 1.25 per flight sector
Air New Zealand US$3.10 per flight coupon
Malaysian Airlines US1.25 per flight sector
Air Canada C$3 per one way
China Airlines US$2.50 per flight sector
Air Transat joined its Canadian rivals on October 5, 2001 by
announcing it would charge passengers C$3 extra per one way
trip to cover soaring insurance costs following the September 11
attacks on the United States. Air Transat said that the surcharge
would be applied on all its domestic, transborder and interna-
tional fights, starting October 8, 2001. Air Transat is the last
major Canadian carrier to impose such a surcharge. Air Canada,
the country's dominant carrier, and no-frills airlines WestJet and
Canada 3000 each imposed a C$3 fee in recent weeks.
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KLM said on September 22, 2001, that it had reopened book-
ings for this week after the Dutch government agreed to grant
war risk insurance.2 4 KLM announced it was adding a US$5 a
flight surcharge to fares immediately to help cover the cost of
additional safety procedures being taken since the US aircraft
attacks. KLM was reported to have claimed this as a safety
surcharge and that the airline had taken a lot of measures to
boost safety, incurring costs. 2 5
The Spanish government and domestic airlines agreed to im-
plement the Ecofin accord, in which Insurance Compensation
Consortium (ICC) will pay insurance premiums for the airlines'
risk against war and terrorism for a period of one month.
On September 28, 2001 IATA hosted a meeting of air carriers,
financiers, national governments, freight forwarders, insurers
and other industry participants to review the current war risk
insurance situation and discuss proposals for dealing with the
current difficulties resulting from the September 24, 2001 with-
drawal by insurers of third party war risk insurance coverage.
IATA proposed that the participants from this meeting should
encourage States to use model or uniform text with respect to
the provision of indemnities or guarantees, and that such guar-
antees must be for a period greater than 30 days, preferably in
the order of 90 days.
In the face of the dramatic recession of insurance coverage,
States began to take measures to provide excess insurance cover-
age to carriers, in most cases up to previous policy limits, for
war-and terrorism-related third party risk. Provision of such cov-
erage meant that at least some air carriers would not be in viola-
tion of domestic and international regulations and lease
covenants respecting war risk cover. However, there was con-
cern expressed with the fact that a considerable number of
countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, while having taken
steps necessary to ensure continued coverage, have not provided
the necessary guarantees and indemnities in the same amount
as States in Europe and North America.
More recently, insurers in the United States envisaged an in-
surance pool along the lines of Britain's "Pool Re," a govern-
ment-backed, mutually-owned company, set up in 1993 after a
24 Air Letter No. 14,835, WORLD AVIATION, SPACE & DEFENCE DAY BY DAY, Sept.
25, 2001.
25 Air Letter No. 14,835, WORLD AVIATION, SPACE & DEFENCE DAY BY DAY, Sept.
26, 2001.
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series of bombs in mainland Britain by Northern Irish terrorists.
Through such a scheme, insurers collect premiums for terror-
ism insurance and the government promises to chip in if claims
exceed the pool's premiums plus reserves. So far, there have
been no settlements by the government, although the important
feature was the guarantee that it would have honoured its com-
mitment if a situation calling for settlement were to arise. This
proposal has not been accepted by the United States, which
takes the position that the insurance industry will meet the first
$10 billion of a terrorist loss and the federal government will
pick up 90% of larger losses, up to $100 billion in the first year.
The insurers would not be required to repay the government.26
Action taken by ICAO Contracting States in responding to the
insurance crisis has legal legitimacy in two international Conven-
tions, the Rome Convention of 195227 and the Montreal Con-
vention of 1 9 9 9 .2' Article 15 of the Rome Convention provides
that any Contracting State may require that the operator of an
aircraft registered in another Contracting State shall be insured
in respect of his liability for damage sustained in its territory for
which a right to compensation exists.29 The operative clause, in
the context of indemnities offered by the several ICAO Con-
tracting States as discussed earlier, is contained in Article 15.4 of
the Rome Convention which provides that, instead of insurance,
inter alia, a guarantee given by the Contracting State where the
aircraft is registered, shall be deemed satisfactory if that State
undertakes that it will not claim immunity from suit in respect of
that guarantee."' The Montreal Convention of 1999, which is
yet to come into force, provides in Article 50 that "States Parties
shall require their carriers to maintain adequate insurance cov-
ering their liability under [the] Convention."3 ' This provision
further stipulates that a carrier may be required by the State
Party into which it operates to furnish evidence that it maintains
adequate insurance covering its liability under the
Convention.32
26 The Risk That Nobody Wants, THe ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001.
27 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181 [hereinafter "Rome Convention"].
28 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2002)) [here-
inafter "Montreal Convention"].
29 Rome Convention, supra note 27, at art. 15.
3I Id. at art. 15.




Coverage provided by airline insurance policies regarding
perils other than third party liability for war risks have not been
affected by this cancellation. War and allied perils coverage with
regard to passengers have been left unchanged but the uncer-
tainty created by the events have made it essential to circum-
scribe coverage for third party losses at a maximum of US$50
million. Although already increasing due to a sustained period
of unprofitable trading in the insurance market, the events
themselves triggered accelerated premium increases, both in or-
der to help markets to recover from the bout of unprofitable
trading and to create an adequate premium base for future exi-
gencies of the nature of the catastrophes of September 2001.
In general terms, the price to be paid to revive or reinstate
adequate coverage for third party was risk coverage would cost
the airlines an additional premium of US$1-25 per passenger
carried. If airlines were to purchase coverage for limits of
US$950 million in excess of the already available US$50 million
they would have to pay US$1.85 per passenger carried. In view
of the fact that airports, re-fuellers, ground handlers and other
service providers in the aviation industry contribute to an ac-
cumulation of risk, since many of them may serve a particular
airline at one location, underwriters were disinclined to offer
coverage for these providers. However, many insurers have
shown willingness to extend coverage for an additional
US$100 million over the US$50 million coverage already
provided.
Both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
and the International Air Transport Association (LATA) have
stringently (and correctly) maintained that there is an inherent
role to be played by governments in the event of war risk claims.
IATA has justifiably claimed, in a well-reasoned argument, that a
new international regime must provide for governments to
agree to act as a multilateral guarantor covering terrorist actions
against airlines in any part of the world.3 IATA has requested
that any solution to the insurance crisis be widely available to
international aviation shareholders, be reasonably affordable,
provide for long term stability even in the event of terrorist acts,
and recognize the inherent role of governments in the event of
war risk claims.
31 Comments of IATA, Special Group on Aviation War Risk Insurance, ICAO
SGWI/1, at 2 (2001), at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/conf/mt/sgwl/
sgwl lreport.pdf (last visited June 4, 2002).
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The above remarks were made at the First Meeting of the
ICAO War Risk Insurance Working Group, held in Montreal in
December 2001. This working group was appointed by the
ICAO Council in response to ICAO Assembly Resolution A33-
20,14 adopted at the 33rd Session of the Assembly in Septem-
ber/October 2001. This resolution urges Contracting States to
work together to develop a non-enduring and coordinated ap-
proach to the important problem of providing assistance to air-
line operators and to other service providers in the field of
aviation war risk insurance. To achieve this objective, the As-
sembly directed the Council to urgently establish a Special
Group to consider the issues referred to above and to report
back to Council with recommendations as soon as possible. The
resolution also broadens ICAO's mandate by inviting the Coun-
cil and the Secretary General to take any other measures consid-
ered necessary or desirable.
At the second meeting of the Working Group, held in Mon-
treal in January 2002, the London Market Brokers Committee
(LMBC) presented a medium term scheme to cover airlines
from war risk liabilities. The scheme envisions the formation of
a company, the board of directors of which shall include repre-
sentatives of participating States, ICAO and participating avia-
tion and insurance industries. The company would offer third
party war risk liability coverage up to US$1.5 billion in excess of
US$50 million per insured. This cover will be non-cancellable,
apply per occurrence and per aircraft where multiple aircraft
are involved. The insurance coverage to be provided by the
company would be available to the entire aviation sector and
include domestic and international operations as well as equip-
ment lessors, financiers and manufacturers of each State that
joins the scheme.
The scheme so outlined offers a continuous coverage of avia-
tion war and other perils based on clauses AVN52D and AVN52F
(which generally exclude coverage of war risk liability with a
write back possibility). The scheme also admits of a full review
by participating Contracting States, to be undertaken at its fifth
anniversary, with an option to cancel or suspend the scheme 90
days thereafter.
Participating States would act as guarantors or "reinsurers of
last resort" through a legal agreement with the insurance com-
pany. In the event of a claim, the contributions of participating
34 A33-20, supra note 11.
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States would be pro-rated based on their ICAO assessments.
Each State's maximum liability under the scheme would be
capped. The total cap, if all ICAO States participate in the
scheme, is expected to be US$15 billion (by way of example, if
only 50% of ICAO Contracting States participate, the total cap
would be US$ 7.5 billion). The maximum exposure of each
State, in any given instance, would be its ICAO assessment per-
centage of the total cap as it may apply, depending on the par-
ticipation of States in the scheme, as outlined above.
Premiums will be collected from the insured in order to build
a reinsurance pool to meet claims under the policies. This pool
will obviate the need for participating States to make cash con-
tributions to the company in the event of a claim. The total
amount of premiums to be collected in the first year is targeted
at US$850 million (equivalent to 50 cents per passenger seg-
ment based on total passenger segments of 1.7 billion). The pre-
miums for subsequent years would be kept at approximately the
same level, provided there were no losses.
Although some members argued that the 50 cents per passen-
ger charge was not an equitable measure for the collection of
the premium (as the numbers carried per flight may differ and
smaller aircraft may not necessarily be considered as much a
threat as weapons of destruction as the larger aircraft which
have larger capacity), the Group decided to work on the basis of
50 cents per passenger as this was considered to be the only
workable means of premium funding.
A. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN INVESTMENT IN AIR
TRANSPORT INSURANCE
The principle of State responsibility in supporting their air
carriers' war risk third party insurance coverage commitments
pervades the argument that liability for third party damage, be it
personal or regarding destruction of property, is not a commer-
cial issue under war risk coverage. Where this reasoning is ap-
plied to the events of September 2001, where persons who had
been cleared for carriage by air by a security system for which
the State was responsible, it becomes clear that an air carrier
should not technically be held responsible for events such as
those of September 11.
At the First Meeting of the ICAO Working Group on War Risk
Third Party Insurance, the International Coordinating Council
of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA) proposed a draft
convention on losses and damages to third parties and property
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caused by unlawful seizure, terrorism or war.3 5 Article 5 of this
draft addresses issues of State security responsibility, and pro-
vides that following a hostile act against aviation causing loss or
damage to any third party or third party property, the State with
security responsibility shall pay to a reinsurance fund an amount
equal to that payable by the fund in connection with that act.
The draft Convention also provides for joint responsibility in
this region if more than one State is involved.
B. INSURING AIR TRANSPORT
In the context of these discussions, it is necessary to examine
the nature of insurance and the manner in which it fits into the
regulatory regime governing air transport. Insurance, in gen-
eral terms, is primarily designed to protect the insured against
loss or damage caused by unforeseen or unexpected future
events, which cannot be predicted or otherwise guarded
against?'6 This definition is equally applicable to air transport,
where liability insurance protects the insured against liability
arising from loss or damage, including injury or death to passen-
gers and third parties- 7 In view of the extremely high risk
posed by war and associated risks which encompass hijacking
and acts of terrorism, an express exclusion is usually incorpo-
rated in the insurance policy of a carrier, which is known as
"AVN48B ''sH as used in the London insurance market. Certain
risks excluded by this clause, however, can be "written back" into
the policy in return for an increased or additional premium. In
the case of liability insurance, all excluded rules may be written
back with the exclusion of hostile detonation or explosion of a
nuclear weapon.
It is arguable that when applying the above definition, insur-
ance can be identified as a commercial or economic exigency
affecting the air carrier as a reimbursement of a loss incurred.
On this basis one can ask the question as to whether insurance
coverage or lack thereof directly affects the operators of a car-
rier, particularly in the context of a war situation.
'5 SGW1/1-WP/3 Appendix.
13 Rod D. Margo, Aspects of Insurance in Aviation Finance, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 423
(1996).
.17 Id. at 429.
38 AVN48B excludes risks of war, invasion, hostilities, civil war, rebellion, reso-
lution, insurrection, martial law, hostile detonation of atomic weapons, strikes,
riots, civil commotions or labour disturbances, acts of a political or terrorist na-
ture, sabotage, confiscation, nationalization, seizure and hijacking.
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The Preamble to the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion reflects agreement on the Contracting States for the devel-
opment of international air transport in a safe and orderly
manner and its operation soundly and economically.3 9 Article 4
of the Convention acknowledges each Contracting State's agree-
ment not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with
the aims of the Convention. 40 In the specific context of this arti-
cle, two issues emerge: (1) whether there is an implied obliga-
tion on the part of Contracting States to ensure that civil
aviation is not used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims
of the Convention, and (2) what the aims of the Convention are.
At the Chicago Conference of 1944 which gave rise to the Con-
vention, Article 4 was originally intended to read as follows:
In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect
the freedom of action of any of the member States affected,
whether as belligerents or as neutrals. The same principle shall
apply in the case of any member State which declares a state of
national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.4
This draft did not survive the Conference. However, it gives
an indication of the general approach taken by the pioneers of
regulation, that in a war situation a Contracting State may not
be obligated to honour the aims of the Convention, which are
that civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly man-
ner and international air transport services may be established
on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly
and economically.
If one were to argue that the Chicago Convention imposes an
implicit obligation on Contracting States to ensure that insur-
ance coverage be maintained, as a part of the overall obligation
to ensure that air transport services are operated soundly and
economically, what happens in a war situation?42 Could States
absolve themselves of this obligation as per the original ap-
proach taken in Article 4 of the Convention? If, on the other
hand, taking literally the current text of Article 4 that States
should ensure the civil aviation should not be used for any pur-
39 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1.
40 Id. at art. 4.
41 U.S. Dep't of State, Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Confer-
ence, at 661 (1948) (detailing the proceedings in Chicago, Illinois, on Nov. 1 -
Dec. 7, 1944).
42 For insurance purposes, a formal declaration of war is not an absolute nec-
cessity. See, e.g., Kawasaki Kissen Kbushiki Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship
Co. Ltd., 2 K.B. 544, 556 (1939).
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pose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention, should States
ensure the security of aircraft? Additionally, if a State is found to
be responsible for an event which violates the principle en-
shrined in Article 4, should that State be held responsible for
the continued operation of air services by the carrier affected?
The problem of "misuse of civil aviation," "improper use of
civil aviation," "undue use of civil aviation," or "criminal use of
civil aviation" was raised by several delegations at the 25th Ses-
sion (Extraordinary) of the ICAO Assembly in April/May 1984.
It was also mentioned by several Representatives on the Council
during discussions on the proposed amendment of Annex 2 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation with respect to
interception of civil aircraft. The problem to be addressed is
essentially how to reconcile the protection of civil aircraft in situ-
ations of interception with the protection of the law and order
of States concerned and with the enforcement of such applica-
ble laws. The scope of the problem encompasses the concern of
several States as to whether Article 3 bis of the Chicago Conven-
tion and the amended Annex 2 leave sufficient safeguards for
States to prevent, prosecute and punish the deliberate use of
civil aircraft for unlawful purposes.
Article 3 bis provides inter alia that every State must "refrain
from" resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight.4 3 The term "refrain from" does not provide the necessary
strength to the provision as it does not explicitly prohibit the use
of weapons against aircraft in flight.
Article 4 of the Chicago Convention is the only provision in
the Convention explicitly using the words "misuse of civil avia-
tion;" even there, however, the expression is used only in the
heading and not in the substantive text of the Article.44 The
first paragraph of the Preamble to the Convention refers to
"abuse" of international civil aviation without any attempt at a
definition of that term.45
Article 4 of the Convention has never been the subject of or
involved in a decision or interpretation made by either the As-
sembly or the Council. The drafting history of this Article indi-
cates that the underlying intent of Article 4 was to prevent the
use of civil aviation by States for purposes, which might create a
threat to the security of other nations. The intent of Article 4
43 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
44 Id. at art. 4.
45 Id.
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originated in the Canadian "Preliminary Draft" which stated as
one of the purposes of ICAO as "averting the possibility of the
misuse of civil aviation creating a threat to the security of na-
tions and to make the most effective contribution to the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a permanent system of general
security." In the further drafting development ("the Tripartite
Proposal" presented to the Conference by the Delegations of
the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) the wording
was changed to read: "Each member State rejects the use of civil
air transport as an instrument of national policy in international
relations." This wording practically repeated the text of the
Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 27 August 1928 (com-
monly known as the Briand-Kellog Pact) in which the signatories
renounced war "as an instrument of national policy in their mu-
tual relations." The words "purposes inconsistent with the aims
of this Convention" in Article 4 therefore essentially mean
"threats to the general security."
Article 4 does not offer any solution to the problem of "mis-
use of civil aviation" within the scope of the status of an aircraft,
which is used for criminal or other unlawful purposes. The Chi-
cago Convention does not contain any provisions that anticipate
the specific situations when an aircraft is used for or involved in
criminal activities or other activities violating the law and public
order of the State. However, there are numerous provisions in
the Convention which offer effective safeguards to States that
their applicable laws and public order are observed by foreign
aircraft (with respect to aircraft of its own registry, the State con-
cerned has unrestricted jurisdiction).4" Articles 11, 12 and 13 of
the Convention in essence confirm the rule of general interna-
tional law that foreign aircraft, its crew, passengers and cargo do
not enjoy any "extraterritorial" status while in the airspace or on
the ground of another State; such aircraft are fully subject to the
applicable laws of the State concerned. 47 Under the Conven-
tion, the State may require the landing of a foreign aircraft in-
volved in non-scheduled flight (Article 5), may prohibit or
restrict foreign aircraft from flying over certain parts of its terri-
tory or over the whole territory (Article 9), may require landing
of foreign aircraft at a designated customs airport (Article 10),
may search the foreign aircraft (Article 16) and may regulate or
46 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1.
47 Id. at arts. 11, 12, 13.
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prohibit the carriage of certain articles in or above its territory
(Article 35 (b)). 4"
It is submitted that all States possess within the existing frame-
work of the Chicago Convention full jurisdiction in the applica-
tion of their respective laws to prevent or prohibit the use of
civil aircraft for unlawful purposes. The practical problem
therefore does not arise in terms of choice-of-law, but in the
field of practical enforcement of such laws with respect to air-
craft, particularly aircraft in flight.
In the case of criminal acts, the practical enforcement of legal
obligations involves a procedure which includes the arrest and
taking into custody of the suspected offender, collection and
presentation of pertinent evidence, judicial evaluation of the ev-
idence and evaluation of the points of defence, judicial convic-
tion, sentencing and execution of the judgement. All aspects of
such legal procedure are governed by lexfori, i.e. the domestic
law of the court seized of the case. That law would determine
inter alia what degree of force (including the possible use of
weapons) may be legally employed in the process of arrest of the
suspected offender. As a rule, that level of force is to be propor-
tionate and adequate to the level of public danger created by
the suspected offender and by the level of force used by the sus-
pected offender in resisting arrest.
The only legal provision available in terms of international
treaty law on the subject of responsibility for third party liability
of air carriers is contained in the Convention on Damage
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface,
signed in Rome in 1952, Article 15 of which provides that any
Contracting State may require that the operator of an aircraft
registered in another Contracting State shall be insured in re-
spect of this liability for damage sustained in its territory for
which a right to compensation exists by means of insurance up
to the limits applicable according to the relevant requirements
of the Convention.49 There is provision in the Convention that,
instead of insurance, one of the securities acceptable would be a
guarantee given by the Contracting State where the aircraft is
registered, if that State undertakes that it will not claim immu-
nity from suit in respect of that guarantee.5 °
48 Id. at arts. 5, 9, 10, 16, 35(b).




C. RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
States have clearly assumed responsibility for the operation of
air services by their national carriers and the circumstances,
rules, and regulations under which they are carried out. This is
evidenced in the bilateral air services agreements signed by and
between States laying down principles and conditions of opera-
tions. States are also responsible for the provision of security
within their territories. Arguably, States should then be respon-
sible for the clearance of passengers for air carriage when such
passengers embark within their territories. If such were the
case, air carriers should not be required to face fiscal responsi-
bility for breaches of security that impend their aircraft, injuries
to third parties, and property damage on the ground as a result
of such breaches.
The applicable legal procedure is determined by the sover-
eign State and "the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations" as reflected in Article 38, 1 (c) of the Statute of the
International Court ofJustice.5 ' These are elements of the general
international law, including the general concept of human
rights and specifically the protection of human life, and pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal procedure. The principles
of modern general international law in this field reflect the re-
quirement of "due process" in the procedure for the enforce-
ment of laws.
Problems of interception of and other enforcement measures
with respect to a civil aircraft in flight are directly addressed in
Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, 2 adopted by unani-
mous consensus on May 10, 1984 by the 25th Session (Extraordi-
nary) of the ICAO Assembly. The drafting history of this Article
supports the conclusion that Article 3 bis is declaratory of the
existing general international law with respect to the following
elements:
a) obligation of States to refrain from resorting to the use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight;
b) obligation, in case of interception, not to endanger the lives
of persons on board and the safety of aircraft; and
c) right of States to require landing at a designated airport of a
civil aircraft flying above its territory without authority or if
51 Stat. of the Int'l Ct. of J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 38, 1(c) (entered
into force Oct. 24, 1945).
52 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
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there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being used
for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention.
While Article 3 bis accepted in paragraphs (b) and (d) the
terminology "for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the
Convention" as it is used in Article 4 of the Convention, the
drafting history indicates conclusively that the scope of the
phrase is different in Article 3 than in Article 4. At the 25th
Session (Extraordinary) of the Assembly this phrase was meant
to cover not only violations of the "aims" of the Chicago Con-
vention as spelled out in the Preamble to the Convention and in
its Article 44 (which deals with the aims and objectives of the
Organization rather than the Convention), but any violation of
the law and public order of the State concerned. In the Assem-
bly discussions, specific references were made to transport of il-
licit drugs, contraband, gun running, illegal transport of
persons, and other crimes.
It should be stressed that the scope of applicability of Article 3
bis is subject to significant restrictions; the protection of this Ar-
ticle is reserved only to:
a) "civil aircraft;" consequently, "state aircraft" would not enjoy
the same protection; and
b) civil aircraft "in flight;" while the Convention does not define
the concept "in flight," it is likely that this phrase will be inter-
preted in harmony with Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Rome
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third
Parties on the Surface of 1952 and Article 1, paragraph 3 of
the Tokyo Convention of 1963. An aircraft shall be deemed
to be in flight from the moment when power is applied for
the purpose of take-off until the moment when the landing
run ends. Consequently, aircraft which are not "in flight" do
not enjoy the special protection of Article 3 bis.
It is also submitted that the protection of Article 3 bis is re-
served to "foreign" aircraft and does not include aircraft of the
State's own registration. After discussions in the Executive Com-
mittee of the Assembly, the reference to aircraft "of the other
contracting State" was dropped for the specific reason that the
protection was to be recognized as mandatory with respect of
aircraft, whether belonging to contracting or non-contracting
States. At no stage to the deliberations and drafting did the As-
sembly (in the Plenary, in the Executive Committee or in the
Working Group) contemplate regulation of the status of an air-
craft in relation to the State of its own registration, as this would
have exceeded the scope of the Convention, which limits it to
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international civil aviation. Again, the purpose of the Chicago
Convention is to establish conventional rules of conduct in the
mutual relations of sovereign States but not to govern matters of
their exclusive domestic jurisdiction. Consequently, Article 3 bis
will not apply to the treatment of aircraft by the States of their
registration. This conclusion does not imply that a State is free
to treat aircraft of its own registration without regard to any
rules of international law; other sources of international law,
such as the International Covenants on Human Rights, may be
relevant for the conduct of States to ensure the protection of
the right to life, requirement of due legal process, and the pre-
sumption of innocence.
When requiring a civil aircraft that is flying above its territory
to land, or when issuing other instructions to the aircraft to put
an end to a "violation," contracting States may resort to any ap-
propriate means consistent with relevant rules of international
law, including the Chicago Convention and, specifically, para-
graph (a) of Article 3 bis. Consequently, Article 3 bis does not
exclude enforcement against foreign aircraft in flight and does
not rule out the use of adequate and proportionate force and
does not rule out interception as such. Any act of interception
or other enforcement measure not involving the use of weapons
against civil aircraft in flight and not endangering the lives of
persons on board and the safety of flight is acceptable. Any in-
terception procedures consistent with the applicable Standards
and Recommended Practices adopted by the Council of ICAO
pursuant to Articles 37, 54(1) and 90 of the Chicago Convention
would be "consistent with relevant rules of international law."53
Two additional provisions of Article 3 bis are likely to deter
the occurrences of "misuse" of civil aviation.
First, civil aircraft are unconditionally obliged to comply with
an order to land or other instruction; contracting States are ac-
cepting, under paragraph (c) of Article 3 bis, an obligation to
establish all necessary provisions in the national law or regula-
tions to make such compliance mandatory for aircraft of their
registration or operated by an operator having his principal
place of business or permanent residence in that State. 54 Con-
tracting States are also accepting an obligation to make violation
of such laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and to
53 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at art. 37, 54(1), 90.
54 Id. at art. 3.
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submit the case to their competent authorities." This provision
may offer a practical safeguard that no violators would go un-
punished; even if they were to escape from the jurisdiction of
the State where the unlawful act was committed, they should be
prosecuted and punished by the State of the registration of the
aircraft; in practical application this provision may be reinforced
by existing or future arrangements for extradition of offenders.
Second, all contracting States are accepting an unconditional
obligation to take appropriate measures to prohibit any deliber-
ate "misuse" of any civil aircraft of their registration or operated
by an operator having his principal place of business or perma-
nent residence in that State. Legislative implementation of such
a prohibition will no doubt be accompanied by appropriate
penalties.
States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over foreign aircraft
in flight over their territory as well as over the territory not sub-
ject to sovereignty of any State, such as the high seas, as set forth
in the Tokyo Convention of 1963.56 Article 4 of that Convention
permits "interference" with an aircraft in flight in order to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board
in the following cases:
a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or
permanent resident of such State;
c) the offence is against the security of such State;
d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations
relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such
State; and
e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the obser-
vance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral in-
ternational agreement.57
Since the Tokyo Convention has been accepted by many of
ICAO's Contracting States, this provision represents an impor-
tant additional clarification to Article 3 bis of the Chicago Con-
vention with respect to the interpretation of the term "any
purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention." It is
submitted that any offence foreseen in Article 4 of the Tokyo
Convention gives right to the State concerned to "interfere,"
such as requiring the aircraft to land or giving the aircraft other
55 Id.
51 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
57 Id. at art. 4.
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instructions or resorting to proportionate and adequate use of
force against such aircraft. The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea does not foresee the right of hot pursuit of
aircraft; the target of hot pursuit may be exclusively a ship but
the procedures of hot pursuit may be affected by an aircraft.
The study of the problem of "misuse" of civil aviation and of
its consequences for law enforcement with respect to civil air-
craft in flight leads to the following conclusions:
a) Although the term "misuse of civil aviation" is a legally impre-
cise term which has no firm basis in the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation apart from the title of Article 4, it still
reflects the overall threat posed by unlawful interference with
civil aviation.
b) The phrase "any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention" has historically a different meaning in Article 4
of the Convention and in paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article 3
bis.
c) The concept of "misuse of civil aircraft" should best be re-
ferred to as "deliberate use of civil aircraft for unlawful
purposes.
d) The Chicago Convention contains effective provisions safe-
guarding full jurisdiction of States to prevent or prohibit the
use of foreign aircraft for unlawful purposes in their territory.
The above conclusions may be drawn upon to use the relevant
provisions of the Chicago Convention as a base to interpret
other legal documents that would enforce more stringent con-
trol over this offence. Some recommendations in this regard
are discussed infra.
The provisions of the Chicago Convention, as is any interna-
tional treaty, are binding on contracting States to the Conven-
tion. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases,58 held that legal principles that are incor-
porated in treaties, such as the "common interest" principle, be-
come customary international law by virtue of Article 38 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.5' Article 38
recognizes that treaty rules are binding upon a third State, if it is
generally recognized as such by the States concerned. Obliga-
tions arising from jus cogens are considered applicable erga omnes
which would mean that States using space technology owe a duty
58 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20).
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 38, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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of care to the world at large in the provision of such technology.
The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case held:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obliga-
tions of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis a vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concerns of
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnesi °
The International Law Commission has observed of the ICJ
decision:
[I] n the Courts view, there are in fact a number, albeit limited, of
international obligations which, by reason of their importance to
the international community as a whole, are- unlike others - obli-
gations in respect of which all States have legal interest.61
The views of the ICJ and the International Law Commission,
which has supported the approach taken by the ICJ, give rise to
two possible conclusions relating to jus cogens and its resultant
obligations erga omnes:
a) obligations erga omnes affect all States and thus cannot be
made inapplicable to a State or group of States by an exclu-
sive clause in a treaty or other document reflecting legal obli-
gations without the consent of the international community
as a whole; and
b) obligations erga omnes preempt other obligations which may
be incompatible with them.
Some examples of obligations erga omnes cited by the ICJ are
prohibition of acts of aggression, genocide, slavery and discrimi-
nation.62 It is indeed worthy of note that all these obligations
are derivatives of norms which are jus cogens at international law.
International responsibility relates both to breaches of treaty
provisions and other breaches of legal duty. In the Spanish Zone
of Morocco Claims case, Justice Huber observed:
[R] esponsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of
an international character involve international responsibility. If
the obligation in question is not met, responsibility entails the
duty to make reparation. 3
60 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
61 Fifth Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/291 and Add.1 and 2, Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, Vol II, Part One 3, 29 (1976).
62 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.
W" Spanish Zone of Morocco (U.K. v. Spain), 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 641 (1925).
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It is also now recognized as a principle of international law
that the breach of a duty involves an obligation to make repara-
tion appropriately and adequately. This reparation is regarded
as the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a conven-
tion and is applied as a premise that need not be stated in the
breached convention itself."4 The ICJ affirmed this principle in
1949 in the Corfu Channel case by holding that Albania was re-
sponsible under international law to pay compensation to the
United Kingdom for not warning that Albania had laid mines in
Albanian waters which caused explosions, damaging ships be-
longing to the United Kingdom.65 Since both the treaty provi-
sions of liability and the general principles of international law
endorse the liability of States to compensate for damage caused
by space objects, there is no question that damage caused by the
use of nuclear power sources in outer space would be
compensated.
The sense of international responsibility that the United Na-
tions ascribed to itself had reached a heady stage at this point,
where the role of international law in international human con-
duct was perceived to be primary and above the authority of
states. In its Report to the General Assembly, the International
Law Commission recommended a draft provision which stated:
Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States
in accordance with international law and with the principle that
the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of inter-
national law.66
This principle, which forms a cornerstone of international
conduct by States, provides the basis for strengthening interna-
tional comity and regulating the conduct of States both within
their territories and towards other States. States are effectively
precluded from pursuing their own interests with disregard to
principles established by international law.
State responsibility is accepted as an established principle of
public international law. This principle is based on both sub-
stantive rules of law and the imputability to a State of acts and
omissions of that State that may be categorized as legally repre-
hensible or illegal by reference to established norms and rules
64 Chorzow Factory (Jurisdiction), 1927 P.C.IJ.(ser. A) No. 9, at 21.
65 Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9)..
66 Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the First Session, A/CN.4/13, Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N (1949).
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identifying rights and duties. 67 The notion of culpa is often used
to denote blameworthiness predicated upon reasonable foresee-
ability or foresight without consequences. Culpa is generally not
a condition of liability per se, but in certain contexts it may be
imputed to a State whose officials are negligent in not foresee-
ing the consequences of their acts or omissions. In such in-
stances, a causal nexus has of necessity to be established
between the act or omission and the result. In the Lighthouse
arbitration, which was undertaken in 1956 by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the Court held that damage
should be a foreseeable and normal consequence of an act or
omission.6 In instances where a State engages in lawful prac-
tices, responsibility may be attributed to a State for lack of dili-
gence.6 9 This principle is born out by the fundamental judicial
acceptance that the State bears an international responsibility
for all acts committed by its officials or its organs which are
delictual or tortuous according to principles of public interna-
tional law. 70 In order that this objective criterion of responsibil-
ity be applied, it is important to determine that officials act as
authorized officials or instrumentalities of State, or that in so
acting or omitting to act they use powers or measures appropri-
ate to their official character.
In the event of localized violence or mob attacks, contrived
and substantial neglect to take the necessary and reasonable
precautions to avoid damage or prevent injury would be tanta-
mount to official indifference and will create responsibility for
damage to persons and property, particularly if interests are
vested in foreign hands.
The aviation industry needs its credibility to be restored with
the insurance industry at least partially, if not totally. The cost
of achieving this challenge to airlines may be considerable. The
civil aviation sector is of considerable dimension, and the air-
lines are integrated from an information technology (IT) stand-
point to airports, ground handling, avionics and engineering,
air traffic control, and maintenance in their daily operations.
This means that the IT requirements of each of these sectors,
however varied and multifarious, have to mesh together for se-
67 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1992).
68 Lighthouses (Fr. v. Greece), 12 R.I.A.A. 155, 23 I.L.R. 659 (1956).
- In re Rizzo, 22 I.L.R. 317, 322 (1955).
70 Caire (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 530 (1929).
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curity and safety purposes so that airlines may perform their task
of carrying passengers and freight without mishap.
Aviation insurers will certainly be concerned as to how their
insured are going to handle the credibility challenge. Any flaw
in the preparation of the insured airlines in fixing the problem
has direct potential ramifications on the insurance industry,
which will have to pay up claims resulting from safety-related
incidents and accidents involving aircraft.
It is a high possibility that the insurance industry will require
States to show that they exercised due diligence or, in other
words, adequately dispensed with the duty of care they owed to
the consumer in addressing and solving their security problems.
In this context, legal principles applicable to States and their
instrumentalities responsible for providing preventive measures
to ensure security would be analogous to those applicable to
professionals who profess special skills such as medical doctors
and the diligence and care required of such a category would be
objectively assessed at a higher level than that which is required
of the common man. At common law, therefore, the jurispru-
dence related to medical malpractice would be a distinct anal-
ogy and the principles enunciated therein would serve as a
yardstick in instances where State responsibility is assessed.
Under English law, the burden of proving negligence rests on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to prove that the defendant was
negligent and that such negligence resulted in the loss or injury
alleged. English law knows no sharp categories of care. A de-
fendant must exercise the degree of care and diligence that cor-
responds to the degree of negligence for which he is
responsible,7" and the defendant must do what is reasonable in
the circumstances. A good example is the case of Marshall v.
Lindsay,"2 which held that a defendant who is charged with pro-
fessional negligence can clear himself if he shows that he acted
in accordance with general or approved practice. A 1953 deci-
sion held that the competent practitioner would know when a
case is beyond his skill and thereupon it would become his duty
either to call in a more skilled person or to order removal of the
patient to a hospital where skilled treatment is available.7 - The
case had also held that when a consultant takes over the respon-
sibility for the treatment of a patient, it is a defence in favor of
71 Giblin v. McMullen, 2 L.R.-P.C. 317, 337 (1868).
72 Marshall v. Lindsay, 1 K.B. 516, 540 (1935).
73 Pudney v. Union Castle Mail S.S. Ltd. Lloyd's Rep. 73 (1953).
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that consultant to show that he had acted on the specific instruc-
tions given to her by another consultant. This principle would
indeed be persuasive authority in the case of computer consul-
tants hired by the aviation industry to correct the millennium
problem.
It can also be observed that, in strict legal analysis, negligence
means more than heedless or careless conduct whether in omis-
sion or commission; it properly connotes a breach of duty,
which causes damage to the person to whom the duty owed.
However, a doctor failing to diagnose a disease cannot excuse
himself by showing that he acted to the best of his skill if a rea-
sonable doctor would have diagnosed it."4 The civil liability of
medical professionals towards their patients is compendiously
stated in R. v. Bateman7" as follows:
[I]f a person holds himself out as possessing special skill and
knowledge and he is consulted as possessing such skill and
knowledge, by or on behalf of a patient, he owes a duty to the
patient to use due caution in undertaking the treatment. If he
accepts the responsibility and undertakes the treatment and the
patient submits to his direction and treatment accordingly, he
owes a duty to the patient to use diligence, care, knowledge, skill
and caution in administering the treatment. No contractual rela-
tion is necessary, nor is it necessary that the service be rendered
for reward .... The law requires a fair and reasonable standard
of care and competence. This standard must be reached in all
the matters above mentioned. If the patient's death has been
caused by the defendant's indolence or carelessness, it will not
avail to show that he had sufficient knowledge; nor will it avail to
prove that he was diligent in attendance, if the patient has been
killed by his gross ignorance and unskillfulness .... As regards
cases where incompetence is alleged, it is only necessary to say
that the unqualified practitioner cannot claim to be measured by
any lower standard than that which is applied to a qualified man.
There may be recklessness in undertaking the treatment and
recklessness in the conduct of it. It is, no doubt, conceivable that
a qualified man may be held liable for recklessly undertaking a
case which he knew, or should have known, to be beyond his
powers, or for making his patient the subject of reckless experi-
ment. Such cases are likely to be rare."
74M. Brazier, STREET ON TORTs 205 (7 h ed. 1982).
75 R. v. Bateman, 94 L.J.K.B. 791 (1925); see Akerele v. The King, A.C. 255
(1943); see also Linden, The Negligent Doctor, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 31 (1973).
76 Id. at 798.
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The primary question therefore is whether in all the circum-
stances the defendant acted with the skill and competence to be
expected from a person undertaking the particular activity and
professing his specific skill.
One of the difficulties that may be encountered in the deter-
mination of professional negligence is whether there are spe-
cific established norms within a particular jurisdiction on what
constitutes proper professional practice. The classic statement
of the governing principles is to be found in the jury instruction
given by McNair in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee77
[Wlhere you get a situation which involves the use of some spe-
cial skill or competence, then the test whether there has been
negligence or not is not the test of the man on top of the
Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The
test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and
professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the
highest expert skill at the risk of being found negligent. It is well
established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary
skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular
art... [T]here may be one or more perfectly proper standards;
and if a medical man conforms with one of those proper stan-
dards then he is not negligent ... a mere personal belief that a
particular technique is best is no defense unless that belief is
based on reasonable grounds.., a doctor is not negligent if he is
acting in accordance with ... a practice (accepted as proper by a
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art),
merely because there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary
view. At the same time, that does not mean that a medical man
can obstinately and pigheadedly carry on with some old tech-
nique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really sub-
stantially the whole of informed medical opinion. '"78
The Bolam test has been applied to every exercise of profes-
sional skill and judgement. The courts have rejected attempts to
categorize professional tasks by subdividing them for the pur-
pose of ignoring the Bolam case in particular contexts.79 The
test is not merely confined to cases relating to highly technical
skills."0 The Bolam case has received the approval in Parlia-
ment,8 the House of Lords 2 and the Privy Council. s"
77 Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-87 (1957).
78 Id.
79 Gold v. Haringey Health Auth., 1 Q.B. 481, 489 (1988).
80 Alchemy (Int'l) Ltd. v. Tattersalls Ltd., 2 E.G.L.R. 17 (1985).
81 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, ch. 28 § 1.
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The House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan,8 4 rejected the idea
that mere errors of judgement cannot amount to negligence."5
Lord Fraser observed:
[A]n error of judgement may, or may not, be negligent; it de-
pends on the nature of the error. If it is one that would not have
been made by a reasonable competent professional man profess-
ing to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant held
himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, then it is
negligent.8 6
It is generally recognized that in determinations of negligence
on the part of medical practitioners, the defendant must exhibit
the degree of skill which a member of the public would expect
from a person in his position. Pressures on her for which he is
in no way responsible will not detract from guilt for an error on
his part.
Moral responsibility and incompetence are generally consid-
ered mutually exclusive from negligence. In Wilsher v. Essex Area
Health Authority, a baby was blinded when the hospital's staff neg-
ligently administered too much oxygen. 7 The plaintiff was an
infant child who was born prematurely suffering from various
illnesses, including oxygen deficiency. His prospects of survival
were considered to be poor and he was placed in the 24-hour
special care baby unit at the hospital where he was born. The
unit was staffed by a medical team consisting of two consultants,
a senior registrar, several junior doctors and trained nurses.
While the plaintiff was in the unit, a junior and inexperienced
doctor monitoring the oxygen in the plaintiffs bloodstream
mistakenly inserted a catheter into a vein rather than an artery
but then asked the senior registrar to check what he had done.
The registrar failed to see the mistake and some hours later,
when replacing the catheter, did exactly the same thing himself.
Mustill L.J. observed:
82 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp., I W.L.R. 480 (1985); Maynard v. West Mid-
lands Reg. Health Auth., I W.L.R. 634 (1984); Whitehouse v. Jordan, 1 W.L.R.
246 (1981).
83 Chin Keow v. Gov't of Malaysia, 1 W.L.R. 813 (1967).
84 Whitehouse v. Jordan, 1 W.L.R. 246, 258 (1981).
85 Id. An argument to this effect had been put forward by Lord Denning in the
Court of Appeal. Lord Denning was concerned that there might be an explosion
of medical malpractice claims if the courts did not reduce the standard of care
applicable to professional persons.
86 Id.
87 Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Auth., 1 Q.B. 730 (1987).
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This appeal raises three questions of law relating to the allega-
tion that the defendants are liable for breach of duty. (1) What
is the nature of the cause of action on which the plaintiff relies?
(2) What standard of care was demanded of those members of
the medical and nursing staff who are said to have been negli-
gent? (3) On whom rests the burden of proof in relation to the
allegation of negligence?88
His Lordship also quoted with approval the Bolam case:
A doctor who adopts a practice accepted as proper by a responsi-
ble body of medical men skilled in the relevant branch of
medicine is not to be taken as negligent merely because there is a
contrary view. Although this principle may have some bearing
on the later episodes, it can have nothing to do with the first
episode, for, although there were witnesses who regarded it as
excusable in a young doctor not to know about the significance
of the loop and its absence, there was no body of medical opin-
ion which could regard it as appropriate to overlook the indica-
tions given by the X-rays as to the position of the catheter. The
doctors made a mistake, although not necessarily a culpable
one.
89
Errors of judgement are often the fundamental basis for neg-
ligence at English law. In Whitehouse v. Jordan,9" the plaintiff who
was born in 1970 with severe brain damage brought an action
against, inter alia the first defendant, a senior registrar at the
time of his birth, and the hospital authority, claiming that the
damage had been caused by the first defendant's professional
negligence. The principal allegations of negligence were that in
the course of carrying out a "trial of forceps delivery" the first
defendant had pulled too long and too strongly on the plain-
tiff's head, thereby causing the brain damage. At the trial, the
mother of the plaintiff said that, when the forceps had been ap-
plied, it had felt like a deadened electric shock that lifted her
hips off the [delivery] bed. Both the first defendant and the
doctor who had assisted him denied that she had been lifted off
the bed or that the first defendant had pulled violently with the
forceps. The first defendant denied that the plaintiff's head had
been wedged or stuck.
Lord Wilberforce observed:
First, it is necessary, in order to establish liability of, and to obtain
an award of compensation against, a doctor or a hospital that
88 Id.
89 Bolam, 3 All. E.R. 801, 812 (1986).
90 Whitehouse v.,Jordan, 1 W.L.R. 246 (1981).
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there has been negligence in law. There is in this field no liability
without proof of fault. Secondly, there are strict limitations upon
this power of an appeal court to reverse the decision of the judge
on an issue of fact.9 1
A significant consideration relating to the plaintiffs burden
of proof of the defendant's negligence is that if the evidence is
equally balanced so that there is no balance of probability in
favor of the plaintiffs contention of negligence, his action fails.
In other words, if it is not clear whether the injury complained
of may have occurred without carelessness on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff will not be considered as having dis-
charged his burden of proof. The 1983 case of Ashcroft v. Mersey
Regional Health Authority concerned a case where the plaintiff
submitted herself to an operation on her left ear. 2 It was per-
formed by a surgeon of long experience, great skill, and the
highest reputation. The operation proved to be disastrous, for
the plaintiff was left with a partial paralysis of the left side of the
face, an injury for which she claimed damages alleging that the
operation was carried out negligently. The paralysis was caused
by damage to the facial nerve. Judge Kilner Brown observed:
Where an injury is caused which never should have been caused,
common sense and natural justice indicate that some degree of
compensation ought to be paid by someone. As the law stands,
in order to obtain compensation an injured person is compelled
to allege negligence against a surgeon who may, as in this case,
be a careful, dedicated person of the highest skill and reputation.
If ever there was a case in which some reasonable compromise
was called for, which would provide some amount of solace for
the injured person and avoid the pillorying of a distinguished
surgeon, this was such a case.9 The proposition that an error of
judgement by a medical man is not negligence is an inaccurate
statement of the law. It may be; it may not. The question for
consideration is whether on a balance of probabilities it has been
established that a professional man has failed to exercise the care
required of a man possessing and professing special skill in cir-
cumstances which require the exercise of that special skill. If
there is an added burden, such burden does not rest on the per-
son alleging negligence; on the contrary, it could be said that the
w Id. at 258.
92 Ashcroft v. Mersey Reg'I Health Auth., [1983] 2 All E.R. 245, affd [1985] 2
All E.R. 96.
, Id. at 246.
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more skilled a person is the more the care that is expected of
him. 4
As has been previously discussed, when a professional lacks
the skill and experience to deal with a particular case, or the
professional realizes the possibility of his client being adversely
affected by that professional's work, he should refer the matter
to someone who is competent to deal with it. In the 1952 case
of Payne v. St. Helier Group Hospital Management Committee, Dono-
van J. held that a medical officer who incorrectly diagnosed a
disease was negligent in that he had failed to refer the patient to
a consultant medical practitioner. 1
5
However, the above principle is tempered by the premise that
if a professional acts in accordance with general and approved
practices of the profession, that would indeed constitute a good
defense to a claim in negligence. In the Canadian Case of Van-
couver General Hospital v. McDaniel, the Privy Council reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia which
imputed negligence to a hospital for allowing a small group of
patients to be in a room with the plaintiff - a diphtheria patient
who contracted small pox thereafter.96 The Privy Council held:
[A] defendant charged with negligence can clear his name if he
shows that he has acted in accordance with general and approved
practice. The appellants, in his Lordship's opinion, even if the
onus rested on them of doing this, have in this case done so by a
weight of evidence that cannot be ignored. 7
The 1955 case of Hunter v. Hanley established three criteria
which determine a doctor's deviation from normal practice.9"
They are:
a) it must be proved that there is a usual and normal practice;
b) it must be proved that the defendant had not adopted that
practice; and
c) it must be established that the course the doctor adopted is
one which no professional man of ordinary skill would have
taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. 99
A proper examination of the patient, particularly if the pa-
tient had not been seen earlier by a doctor for the ailment com-
94 Id. at 246-47.
95 Payne v. St. Helier Group Hosp. Mgmt. Comm. [1952] C.L.Y.B. 2442.
96 Vancouver Gen. Hosp. v. McDaniel, [1935] 152 L.T.R. 56.
97 Id. at 57-58.
98 Hunter v. Hanley, [1955] S.L.T. 213.
99 Id. at 216.
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plained of, is a basic responsibility which would fall in the first
category of usual and normal practice.'l° A wrong diagnosis, if
proved, or a failure to refer a patient to another physician where
necessary, would fit into the third category. Caution must be
exercised, however, in determining whether the doctor could
have, according to her skill, knowledge and experience, diag-
nosed a disease correctly, as in the case of Sadler v. Henry.'0' In
that case, the court held that the defendant medical practitioner
was not negligent in failing to diagnose localized meningitis,
since there were no signs or symptoms which could reasonably
have led him to suspect that condition.
Of comparative interest to the legal liability of the aviation
industry would be the area of tortuous liability relating to medi-
cal malpractice in the United States. Malpractice is defined as
bad or unskillful practice on the part of a physician or surgeon
resulting in injury to a patient'0 2 or the failure of a physician to
exercise the required degree of care, skill and diligence; or the
treatment by a surgeon or physician in a manner contrary to
accepted rules and with injuries resulting to a patient. The law
relating to malpractice is based on three elements:
a) the professional relationship of physician and patient;
b) departure of the physician from some professional duty that
he owed the patient; and
c) the link of such departure of duty to the proximate cause of
injury. 103
In an instance where the physician is a specialist, she is bound
to exercise a degree of skill and knowledge which is usually pos-
sessed by similar specialists. Such skill and knowledge is ex-
pected to be of a higher level than that which is possessed by the
general practitioner. Where the doctor is a specialist she is
bound to exercise that degree of skill and knowledge which is
ordinarily possessed by similar specialists, and not merely the
degree of skill and knowledge of a general practitioner. 11 4 This
rule is well stated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
A physician holding himself out as having special knowledge and
skill in the treatment of a particular organ, disease or type of
1oo See Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., [1969] 1 Q.B.
428; Kavanaugh v. Abramson, [1964] 108 S.J. 320.
lot Sadler v. Henry, [1954] I.B.M.J. 1331.
102 CHARLES KRAMER & DANIEL KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (4th ed.
1976).
1o See id.
104 Beach v. Chollet, 166 N.E. 415 (Ohio 1928).
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injury is bound to bring to the discharge of his duty to a patient
employing him as such specialist, not merely the average degree
of skill possessed by general practitioners, but that special degree
of skill and knowledge possessed by physicians who devote spe-
cial study and attention to the treatment of such organ, disease
or injury, regard being had to the state of scientific knowledge at
the time.'0 5
Similarly, a general practitioner who undertakes to treat a
case which clearly lies within the field of a special branch of
medicine will be held liable for failure to use skill equal to that
of a specialist.' 6
The fundamental principle of professional conduct in the
United States is that the physician is in a position of trust and
confidence with regards to his patient, and it is his duty to act
with the utmost good faith toward the patient. If she knows that
she cannot accomplish a cure or that the treatment adopted will
probably be of no benefit, it is her duty to advise her patient of
these facts.10 7 In Waltuck v. Poushter, it was held incorrect to dis-
miss the complaint where the proof was that the defendant was
called to the decedent's home and treated her for complaints of
malaise, head pains, elevated temperature and blood in her left
ear. 1 8 He was called later that day and advised that her condi-
tion had worsened. Yet he made no effort at treatment or to con-
tact a specialist to evaluate her symptoms. She then died of
meningitis. It was held that a jury could find that his profes-
sional knowledge should have alerted him to the possible conse-
quences of his failure to treat the complaints or perceive the
seriousness of the plaintiff's condition.
105 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 41 (2002).
106 HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 157 (1931); GORDON, TURNER & PRICE,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1953); Monahan v. Devinny, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (N.Y.
1928) (The defendant chiropractors treated the plaintiff unskillfully, as a result
of which he became paralysed. The court held that the defendants were illegally
practising medicine in violation of the Education Law so that "in an action of this
kind they must be held to the same standards of skill and care as prevail amongst
those who are licensed.")
107 REGAN, DOCTOR, PATIENT & THE LAw 34 (1950); Benson v. Dean, 133 N.E.
125 (1921); LLOYD STRYKER, COURTS & DOCTORS 9 (1932) ( "The relationship of
patient and physician is to the highest possible degree a fiduciary one, involving
every element of trust and confidence." The American Medical Association, Prin-
ciples of Medical Ethics, paragraph 8 provides, "A physician should seek consulta-
tion upon request, in doubtful or difficult cases, or whenever it appears that the
quality of medical service may be enhanced thereby); see also Annot, Duty to Send
Patient to Specialist, 132 A.L.R. 392 (1949).
108 WaltUck v. Poushter, 344 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. 1973).
20021
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
It is a fundamental duty of a physician to make a skilful and
careful diagnosis of the ailment of a patient, and if she fails to
bring to that diagnosis the proper degree of skill and care and
makes an incorrect diagnosis, she may be held liable to the pa-
tient. 9 Furthermore, the physician must inform himself by the
proper tests and examinations of the condition of her patient to
undergo a proposed treatment or operation, so that she may
intelligently exercise the skill of his calling." 0 The duty of exer-
cising reasonable skill and diligence includes not only the diag-
nosis and treatment, but also the giving of proper instructions to
her patient in relation to conduct, exercise, and the use of an
injured limb.'"
Another area of common law which brings to bear an interest-
ing analogy in the law of negligence and due diligence is the
Roman-Dutch law. Under Roman-Dutch law negligence falls
within the purview of the ancient lex Aquilian concept of "culpa"
which is established objectively. The question for the courts is
not what a tortfeasor was thinking or not thinking about; expect-
ing or not expecting; but whether his behavior was or was not
such as is demanded of a prudent person under given circum-
stances. Negligence, therefore, may be defined as conduct
which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
The notion of duty of care is essentially an English common
law principle, and Roman-Dutch jurist McKerron cites with ap-
proval the dictum of Lord McMillan in Bourhill v. Young" 2
The duty to take care is the duty to avoid doing or omitting to do
anything the doing or omitting to do which may have as its rea-
sonable and probable consequence injury to others, and the duty
is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and probably be
anticipated if the duty is not observed." 3
In the 1934 case of Perlman v. Zoutendyk," 4 the court delivered
a watershed decision which established the essence of profes-
sional negligence. In this case, a sworn appraiser had issued a
certificate of valuation with the knowledge that it would be used
to induce someone to lend money on the property valued. The
Court held:
1011 61 AM. JUR. Physician and Surgeon and Other Healers § 230 (1981).
110 Id.
I- Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898).
112 Bourhill v. Young, [1942] 2 All E.R. 396, 402.
113 R.M. McKERRON, THE LAW Or DELICT 26 (7th ed. 1971).
"4 Perlman v. Zoutendyk,1934 C.P.D. 151.
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[I] n Roman Dutch law the duty to exercise reasonable care arises
wherever the defendant whose act is complained of should rea-
sonably have foreseen probability of harm being caused by his act
to another person, except, perhaps in those cases in which the
act complained of can be said to be justified or exercised.1"
The above dictum in the Perlman case, when compared with
that of Bourhill v. Young above, reflects that duty of care is a com-
mon feature in both the Roman Dutch law and English com-
mon law. Roman-Dutch law requires two distinct questions to
be answered:
a) what was the standard of care required of the tortfeasor at the
time the alleged tortuous act was committed: and
b) did the conduct of the tortfeasor comply with that standard?
One method courts employ in answer these questions is to
place themselves, as nearly as they can, in the position of the
tortfeasor at the time the act was committed and judge whether
ordinary care which can reasonably be expected from a reasona-
ble person under all circumstances was shown by the
tortfeasor. 16 It is therefore arguable that this fundamental pre-
mise would be extended by jurisdictions which follow the Ro-
man-Dutch law in situations of professional negligence.
One of the most significant principles of Roman Dutch law
principles regarding professional negligence is the maxim imper-
itia culpae adnumeratur, which establishes that negligence is not
determined by the lack of skill of the tortfeasor but in his under-
taking work without skill. Therefore, when a person engages in
a profession which calls for special skill, the degree of skill which
is required is that reasonably to be expected of a person en-
gaged in such profession or occupation. Chief Justice Innes
observed:
[T] he Court will have regard to the general level of skill and dili-
gence possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the
branch of the profession to which the practitioner belongs.17
Under Roman-Dutch law, the burden of proving negligence -
a preponderance of probability - rests with the plaintiff. Proof
must be adduced not only to show the defendant's negligence,
but also to draw a casual link between the defendant's negli-
gence and the harm. Whenever direct evidence of the defen-
115 Id. at 154.
116 S.A.R. v. Bardekber, 1934 A.D. 473, 480 (1934).
117 Van Wyk v. Lewis, 1924 A.D. 438, 444 (1924).
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dant's negligence is not available, negligence may be established
by inference of facts. Moreover, the plaintiff need not demon-
strate his case; the court is entitled to act on a balance of
probabilities.
Therefore, under the Roman-Dutch law, as in English law and
American law, negligence is defined as conduct which involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Negligence is the failure
in given circumstances to exercise that degree of care which the
circumstances demand. A requisite of liability in negligence is
the breach of duty to the plaintiff.
IV. SECURITY MANAGEMENT
At the 33rd Session of the Assembly, the ICAO adopted Reso-
lution A33-1 entitled "Declaration on misuse of civil aircraft as
weapons of destruction and other terrorist acts involving civil
aviation."' ' This Resolution singles out for consideration the
terrorist acts which occurred in the United States on September
11, 2001, and, inter alia, recognizes that the new type of threat
posed by terrorist organizations requires new concerted efforts
and policies of cooperation on the part of States. The Resolu-
tion urges all Contracting States to intensify their efforts to
achieve the full implementation of the multilateral conventions
on aviation security, as well as of the ICAO Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices and Procedures (SARPs) relating to avia-
tion security, to monitor such implementation, and to take
within their territories appropriate additional security measures
commensurate to the level of threat in order to prevent and
eradicate terrorist acts involving civil aviation. ' 9 The Resolu-
tion also urges Contracting States to contribute, in the form of
financial or human resources, to ICAO's aviation security mech-
anism in order to support and strengthen the combat against
terrorism and unlawful interference in civil aviation; calls on
Contracting States to agree on special funding for urgent action
by ICAO in the field of aviation security referred to in para-
graph 7 below; and directs the Council to develop proposals and
take appropriate decisions for a more stable funding of ICAO
118 Declaration of Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and other
Terrorist Acts Involving Civil Aviation, ICAO Res. A33-1 (provisional), ICAO As-
sembly 33rd Sess. (Sept. 25 - Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.icao.org/
icao/en/assembl/a33/resolutionsa33.pdf.
I, d. at 5.
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action in the field of aviation security, including appropriate re-
medial action. 120
Resolution A33-1 directs the Council to convene, at the earli-
est date possible, an international high-level, ministerial confer-
ence on aviation security with the objectives of preventing,
combating and eradicating acts of terrorism involving civil avia-
tion; of strengthening ICAO's role in the adoption of SARPs in
the field of security and the audit of their implementation; and
of ensuring the necessary financial means to strengthen ICAO's
AVSEC Mechanism, while providing special funding for urgent
action by ICAO in the field of aviation security. 12 1
The effects of this resolution can be seen in certain concerted
efforts made both in the United States and Europe to take im-
mediate measures to strengthen aviation security. The Euro-
pean Transport and Telecommunications Council, at its
meeting in Luxemburg on 16 October 2001, welcomed the pro-
posal by the Commission for a Regulation establishing common
rules in the field of civil aviation security122. The Council invited
Member States and the European Commission to contribute to
the preparation of the ICAO High Level/Ministerial Confer-
ence as referred to in Resolution A33-1.
In the United States, Ms. Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator,
stated on October 17, 2001, at a meeting in Washington, that
the United States will start using new technology called the
"Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System," which
would introduce new technologies to detect plastic weapons.
Ms. Garvey further added that Transportation Secretary Mineta
had created a $20 million dollar fund to explore new technolo-
gies to improve aircraft security. These grants could be used to
test any new technology that leads to safer, more secure
aircraft. 123
At its meeting of October 1, 2001, the Rapid Response Team
on Airport Security, formed under Department of Transporta-
tion of the United States, recommended the following measures
for reforming the nation's aviation security system:
* Establishment of a new federal security agency, housed within
the Department of Transport;
120 Id. at 6.
121 Id. at 8.
122 Transport and Telecommunications Council, Luxemburg'(Oct. 16, 2001).
123 SeeJane F. Garvey, The New World of Aviation, Speech at the National Press
Club (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http:www.faa.gov/apa/speeches/2001/
1017spjg.htm.
2002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
" Integration of law enforcement and national security intelli-
gence data with airline and airport systems, including passen-
ger reservation.
" Designation by all airlines and airports of a senior-level security
officer who possesses a security clearance required to act on
sensitive intelligence information;
* Adoption of new technologies for the positive identification of
passengers, airport workers and crews, detection of explosives,
and more effective passenger and baggage screening to be in-
corporated in airport security programs as soon as practicable;
" Establishment by the FAA of an Aviation Technology
Consortium.
" Application of the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening
System (CAPPS) to all passengers.'21 4
These enhanced security measures implicate issues of privacy
and the rights of the airline passenger. Simplified Passenger
Travel (SPT) is a process introduced largely to alleviate the usu-
ally drawn out process of passenger clearance at airports that
has become characteristic of air travel. The SPT system anchors
itself on the use of a smart card that holds relevant information
about the passenger, and that can be swiped through a machine
to provide instant clearance.1 25
The practice of exchanging Advance Passenger Information
(API) goes hand-in-hand with use of the smart card. API has
already proven the usefulness of providing immigration and cus-
toms authorities of a State in whose territory a passenger disem-
barks, with that passenger's information in advance of his
arrival. This information is particularly useful in deciding
whether that passenger would be admissible into the State. The
notion of an API system was conceived and introduced by the
Customs services of certain States. These states identified the
need to address the increased risk posed by airline passengers in
recent years, especially with respect to drug trafficking and
other threats to national security. It was pointed out in compel-
ling terms that in some locations this need to enhance controls,
combined with the growth of air passenger traffic, had begun to
place a severe strain on the resources of Customs and Immigra-
tion authorities, resulting in unacceptable delays in the process-
124 See Dep't of Transp., Meeting the Airport Security Challenge: Report of the
Secretary's Rapid Response Team on Airport Security (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://
www.afa66.org/SAFETY _ALERT.htm.
125 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Automated Screening of Passengers and the Smart
Card - Emerging Legal Issues, 23 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 3, 3-7 (1998).
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ing of arriving passengers at airports. A system in which
identification data on passengers could be sent to the authori-
ties while the aircraft was in flight, to be processed against com-
puter data bases before the passengers arrived, was therefore
envisioned as a means of addressing the twin objectives of better
compliance and faster clearance of low-risk passengers.
As the airlines and control authorities progress in their refine-
ment of the system and improvement of the system perform-
ance, passenger clearance times for trans-oceanic flights (which,
prior to use of API, frequently involved delays in excess of two
hours) have been reduced to averages well below the recom-
mended goal of 45 minutes. In addition to this improvement in
productivity, the control authorities have realized an enhance-
ment of their enforcement efforts, due to the fact that receipt of
information in advance gives them more time to process the in-
formation on the passengers and make better decisions regard-
ing their inspection targets and the appropriate level of control.
The data included in the transmissions between the airlines
and the immigration and customs authorities of recipient states
consists of details contained in the machine readable zone of a
passport of the passenger concerned, 26 plus specific data con-
cerning the inbound flight - e.g. airports of departure/arrival,
flight number and date. An Electronic Data Interchange for Ad-
ministration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT) message
format is used to transmit the data by EDI. The system works
well but demands high levels of completeness and accuracy of
data provided. Unlike cargo shipments, each of which is
processed for clearance on its own track, passengers must pass
through immigration Customs as a "flight" and are interdepen-
dent with respect to the time it takes to clear them. If data on
too many passengers is missing, the whole group is slowed down,
and so are the flights of passengers arriving behind them.
There is an ongoing tug-of-war between the airlines and immi-
gration/Customs over airline system performance standards ver-
sus short clearance times (facilitation benefits) provided by the
authorities. The reality is that the higher the data quality, the
faster the clearance can be accomplished. So the airline has to
meet a certain standard in order to get "blue lane" treatment.
126 Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne, The Development of the Machine Readable Passport
and Visa and the Legal Rights of the Data Subject, 27 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1, 1-31
(1992).
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An important issue that emerges in the API process is that the
data required must be collectable by machine or already con-
tained in the airline's system. Manual collection and data entry
at the check-in desk for a scheduled flight is time-consuming
and prone to errors, and thus, unacceptable. Since most trav-
elers now hold machine readable passports (MRPs) manual in-
put is only necessary on occasion. The concerned authorities
must aim to achieve improvements in security with the use of
these measures.
At its 33rd Session, held in September/October 2001, the
ICAO Assembly acknowledged that new measures were needed
to enhance security, but observed that such measures should not
impede ICAO's ongoing work in improving border control sys-
tems at airports and ensuring the smooth flow of passengers and
cargo. Consequently, the Assembly stressed that ICAO's work
on these issues should continue on an urgent basis.'27 The ma-
chine readable travel document was among specific areas men-
tioned by the Assembly as requiring urgent continuing work, in
keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of Septem-
ber 2001, which re-affirmed the need for continuing work to en-
sure the integrity and security of passports and other travel
documents. 28 In this context, the Assembly agreed that all con-
tracting States should be encouraged to issue their travel docu-
ments in machine readable format and enhance their security in
accordance with ICAO specifications, while introducing auto-
mated travel document reading systems at their international
airports. These measures of the ICAO Assembly bring to bear
the essential link between aviation security and facilitation and
the fact that one cannot be ignored while the other is given
some prominence, as is the case with aviation security at the pre-
sent time.
On February 19 and 20, 2002, a high level ministerial confer-
ence on aviation security was held at the Headquarters of the
International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. In the
words of Dr. Assad Kotaite, President of the ICAO Council who
opened the Conference (and later served as the Chairman of
the Conference), the Conference was being held "at a critical
27 See Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies Related to the
Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interfer-
ence, ICAO Res. A33-2 (provisional), ICAO Assembly 33rd Sess. (Sept. 25 - Oct.
5, 2001), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/a33/index.html.
128 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1373 (2001).
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juncture for civil aviation and for society at large" and the con-
ference would review and develop global strategy for strengthen-
ing aviation security with the aim of protecting lives both in the
air and on the ground, restoring public confidence in air travel
and promoting the health of air transport in order that it can
renew its vital contribution to the world economy.."1 29
At this Conference, attended by Member States of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, some 714 participants
from 154 Contracting States and observers from 24 interna-
tional civil aviation organizations endorsed a global strategy for
strengthening aviation security worldwide and issued a public
declaration at the conclusion of their two-day meeting.
Dr. Kotaite called upon all members of the world aviation
community to give their full and unconditional support to the
Plan of Action and to all elements of our global strategy, in
terms of human and financial resources, so that air transport
remains the safest and most efficient mode of mass transporta-
tion there is. The Plan of Action includes:
" Identification, analysis and development of an effective global
response to new and emerging threats, integrating timely mea-
sures to be taken in specific fields including airports, aircraft
and air traffic control systems;
" Strengthening of the security-related provisions in the Annexes
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, using expe-
dited procedures where warranted and subject to overall safety
considerations, notably to provide for protection of the flight
deck;
" Close coordination and coherence with audit programmes at
the regional and sub-regional level;
" Processing of the results by the ICAO in a way which reconciles
confidentiality and transparency; and a follow-up program for
assistance to rectify identified deficiencies. 130
The Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the Conference
reaffirms condemnation of the use of civil aircraft as weapons of
destruction wherever and by whomsoever and for whatever rea-
son they are perpetrated, while being mindful of the need for
strengthening measures to prevent all acts of unlawful interfer-
ence with civil aviation. It emphasizes the vital role which civil
aviation plays in economic development; stresses the preemi-
129 See Assad Kotaite, Opening Address and Overview by the President of the
Council of the ICAO (Feb. 19, 2002), available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/
chfirst/avsecont2002/PRES-en.pdf.
130 See id.
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nence of safety and security as underlying fundamentals in civil
aviation which need global address; and reaffirms the responsi-
bility of States for the security and the safety of civil aviation,
irrespective of whether the air transport and related services
concerned are provided by Government, autonomous or private
entities.
One of the salient features of the Declaration is that it notes
the significant improvements in aviation security recently initi-
ated in a large number of States; recognizes that a uniform ap-
proach in a global system is essential to ensure aviation security
throughout the world and that deficiencies in any part of the
system constitute a threat to the entire global system; and af-
firms that a global aviation security system imposes a collective
responsibility on all States. The Declaration also notes that the
additional resources which will be required to meet enhanced
aviation security measures may create an undue financial bur-
den on the already limited resources of developing countries.
Through the Declaration, the States participating in the Con-
ference commit to achieving full implementation of the multi-
lateral conventions on aviation security and the ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS) as well as ICAO Assembly Resolu-
tions and Council Decisions relating to aviation security and
safety; applying within national territories appropriate addi-
tional aviation security measures to meet the level of threat; fos-
tering international cooperation in the field of aviation security
and harmonize the implementation of security measures; ensur-
ing that security measures are implemented in a most cost effec-
tive way in order to avoid undue burden on civil aviation;
ensuring to the extent possible that security measures do not
disrupt or impede the flow of passengers, freight, mail or air-
craft; ensuring that security measures are implemented in a
manner which is objective and non-discriminatory on the basis
of gender, race, religion or nationality; enhancing the quality of
human resource functioning within aviation security, including
application of sustained education and training; and restore
public confidence in air travel and revitalize the air transport
industry. '
Several States pledged financial and human resource assis-
tance toward the implementation of the ICAO's proposed ac-




because it achieved its objective of reaching consensus among
154 States as to the compelling need for an aviation security
oversight audit program to be conducted on Contracting States
by ICAO, but also because it proved to be an exemplary attempt
at a global proclamation against acts of terrorism that threaten
the security of the world community. The Conference under-
scored the need for an integrated management structure that
could combat unlawful interference with exigencies of day to
day social and commercial intercourse.
Perhaps the most significant message sent out by the February
2002 High Level, Ministerial Conference is that the world com-
munity must establish a carefully synchronized and thoughtfully
orchestrated plan of action and system of progressing toward
achieving substantial enforcement of aviation security.
The outcome of the Conference was clear evidence that al-
though nations can be shaken by acts of unlawful interference,
the foundations of a "family" of nations and their civilized dis-
course on solidarity and comity can never be destroyed. Also
evident was that long term resolution was an essential supple-
ment to short term retaliation, if an enduring solution were to
be pursued against terrorism. In this case, there is no room for
the rhetoric of war, as there are no boundaries to encroach and
no soldiers to fight. Global terrorism transcends frontiers of
State authority.
In achieving the aforementioned management objectives, the
aviation community should start by attaining a full appreciation
of the potential social and economic advantages of restoring
confidence in air travel worldwide. The starting point should
ineluctably be in the area of regulatory management, where the
ICAO should be called upon to identify and analyze new emerg-
ing and potential threats to civil aviation and formulate appro-
priate practical strategy to address the threats. Once threat
identification is completed, effective management follow
through should involve modular application of technological
tools. Available technology, such as biometric identification
equipment and machine readable travel document readers
should be put to wider and more effective use. Management
databases containing personal information relevant to ensuring
safety should also be used extensively on the basis that the inter-
national use of these databases in providing advance passenger
information is essential as a preventive management tool.
With regard to State responsibility, the Conference sent a
clear message that States should reaffirm their responsibility for
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effective security management. They should ensure integrated
management, through partnerships between aviation and other
authorities, between government and industry, spreading out to
global, regional and inter regional cooperation. Critical to this
exercise would be the conduct by ICAO of aviation security au-
dits, along the lines of aviation safety audits already carried out
by the Organization Procedures for assisting States in taking re-
medial action have to be in place with the necessary follow up
and technical assistance. It is only then that an effective preven-
tive security management system could be developed.
V. COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT
Code sharing, which is a prolific commercial tool used by air
carriers to maximize market access and make full use of provid-
ing capacity to meet demand, presents special challenges from
the perspective of aviation security. A code share is not success-
ful from a marketing point of view if there is no "seamless" cus-
tomer service. Thus, code share partners have to ensure that
security measures adopted by all partners are consistent and
smooth flowing. This would particularly prove to be a challenge
in the present context, where governments may issue mandatory
standards for security on their airlines which may not necessarily
be consistent with standards imposed on those airlines' code
share partners by the latters' governments. In addition, an air
carrier itself may, in view of its particular exigencies, impose se-
curity measures on its passengers that cannot be enforced on
another carrier's passengers. The difficulty of arriving at a com-
mon security system in code sharing essentially lies in the fact
that, while the "operating" carrier is ultimately responsible for
security of a flight, the "marketing" carrier who sells a passenger
his air ticket implicitly warrants that the passenger would be as-
sured of the quality of security usually applied by the marketing
or selling carrier.
Recent events have brought to bear the threat of risk transfer
from one airline to another. In other words, if one airline were
to carry a greater risk of damage than others in a code share
situation (or other airline alliance situation), the risk would be
shared by all partners to the agreement. Specific instances that
may cause delays could well be when a passenger needs to be off
loaded from a code shared flight where that passenger had been
earlier accepted according to the security procedures of another
carrier under a code share agreement; the carriage of escorted
prisoners in various sectors involving code share flights: carriage
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of security sensitive personages such as VIPs in several sectors of
code shared flights; and the challenges of information sharing
between code share partners of a disruptive passenger.
Outsourcing of services, another entrenched commercial
practice in the airline industry, would also come under special
scrutiny from a security perspective. Airlines would have to give
serious consideration to the quality of services they receive from
private entities offering security services. Carriers would, as of
necessity, be compelled to rethink their quality assurance sys-
tems in security, with particular emphasis on security training
and evaluation of implementation.
Security audits, imposed either by government or other enti-
ties which have governmental approval, may be a mandatory fea-
ture for airlines in the future with consistent requirements for
the real assessment and comparative "note sharing" with other
carriers. These measures would indeed have an impact on the
timely despatch of aircraft, requiring passengers to lengthen
their check in times and procedures.
Enhanced costs incurred by carriers, both in providing for im-
proved and more stringent security measures and in absorbing
delays caused by the implementation of such measures, may
have to be met, one way or another. Increased airfares could be
one mode of recovery. The imposition of security charges on
passengers could be another. Guidance with regard to the im-
position of security charges is already available in documenta-
tion of the International Civil Aviation Organization.132
The bilateral requirement of substantial ownership and effec-
tive control, which is based on the fundamental postulate that a
majority ownership provision would effectively preclude foreign
132 ICAO Assembly Doc. 9082/6, ICAO's Policies on Charges for Airports and Air
Navigation Services (6th ed. 2001). The document addresses security charges spe-
cifically in paragraph 29 and in Appendix 1. This policy was originally recom-
mended by the 1981 Conference on Airport and Route Facility Economics,
modified slightly by the 1991 Conference on Airport and Route Facility Manage-
ment, and as such reaffirmed by the Conference on the Economics of Airports
and Air Navigation Services (ANSConf 2000); see also ICAO Assembly Doc. 9562,
The Airport Economics Manual (2001). The manual contains various guidance on
financial and organizational aspects of airport security. This is covered generally,
together with other issues, in different parts of the manual and specifically ad-
dressed in, for example, Chapter 1 - ICAO Policy on Airport Charges, paragraph
1.14; Chapter 2 - Organizational Structures of Airports, paragraph 2.46; Chapter
3 - Airport Financial Control, paragraphs 3.39 and 3.72; Chapter 4 - Determining
the Cost Basis for Charging Purposes, paragraph 4.53; and Chapter 5 - Charges
on Air Traffic and Their Collection, paragraphs 5.26 to 5.28.
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ownership from taking major control of a national carrier, has
not been easy to enforce or put into practice in all situations.
Although a blanket provision might require majority national
ownership and control, airlines and States have had to contend
in many instances with complex issues of nationality of members
of a board of directors, the powers of a board and the powers of
directors of such boards.' Often States have attempted to cir-
cumvent these difficulties by establishing a safeguard to ensure
for the government concerned a "golden share" which accords
the owner government a greater voice in the decision making
process on issues of importance and significance to the carrier
concerned.
Airline alliances may offer a way around circumscriptions of
the market access constraints that may be presented by bilateral
air services agreements. Such alliances however, are not usually
effective against the inhibiting qualities of the traditional owner-
ship and control provisions of the typical agreement, particu-
larly in the context of facilitation of cross border investment,
which is essentially regulated by the bilateral air services agree-
ment. In order to find a practical and legitimate way out of this
seemingly impossible situation, the ICAO devised a pro active
approach based on making the "principal place of business" and
"permanent residence" of the carrier the operative criteria for
purposes of devolution of control.
Both the United States and member States of the European
Union protected their domestic markets from external opera-
tors by preserving these markets for their flag carriers, or at least
carriers that were owned by the State concerned or nationals of
that State. The European Union, pursuant to Article 4 of Court
Regulation 2407/92, vests national authorities with the power to
grant operating licences based on particular criteria 1) the prin-
cipal place of business of the carrier applying for the license
must be located in the licensing member State; 2) the carrier
must be involved in air transportation as its main occupation; 3)
the holder of the license must be under direct or majority own-
ership of nationals of the European Union; and 4) the licensee
must be effectively controlled by such nationals. Effective con-
trol essentially means the power and ability to exercise a decisive
influence on an air transport undertaking, including but not
limited to the use, enjoyment and alienation of movable and
133 See Ownership and Control, Report of the Think Tank - World Aviation
Regulatory Monitor, at 4 (Sept. 7, 2000).
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immovable property of that undertaking. One of the reasons, at
least from the perspective of the European Union, of retaining
the ownership and control criteria within its territory, is to safe-
guard the interests of the member States of the Union and to
preclude carriers of non-EU States from capitalizing on a liberal-
ized European Union Market.
United States law also contains explicit requirements pertain-
ing to nationality of airline management,' 4 with some contrast
to Regulation 2407/92 of the EU, which does not expressly ad-
dress issues regarding nationality of management. Arguably, the
EU addresses external control by stockholders of a company,
and not particularly, as envisaged by the United States law, man-
agement control of the administration and running of the air
transport enterprise.
Be that as it may, both the United States and the European
Union have shown, by their legislation, that the issue of owner-
ship and control still remains a critical consideration in the over-
all picture of liberalization of and competition in air transport.
Under the present circumstances, both the United States and
the European Union may wish to review their positions as to
whether it would now be prudent to retain existing standards of
ownership and control.
One of the most critical issues in the ownership and control
equation is the impact of commercial civilian airlines on military
interests. As an example, under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Pro-
gram (CRAF), United States carriers have pledged a substantial
number of their aircraft to the United States Department of De-
fense. If any other State were to have a similar system, the issue
of foreign nationals ownership and/or control of aircraft that
may be used for defence purposes could be a critical one which
the State would be compelled to consider.
From a regulatory perspective, it is worthy to note that ICAO's
Worldwide Air Transport Conference (Montreal, 1994), which
examined the present and future regulation of international air
transport, recommended that the ICAO proceed with studies
and develop recommendations on a number of issues, including
the review of the traditional air carrier ownership and control
criteria with a view to their broadening. Following this trend,
ICAO's Air Transport Regulation Panel has noted that at the
Conference, the principal objections to broadening the tradi-
tional airline ownership and control criteria for the use of mar-
134 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (a)(15) (1994).
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ket access by using a criterion based on "headquarters, central
administration or principal place of business" were its possible
use as an unacceptable means of gaining market access, abuse
from differing interpretations of the terms involved, and that it
might lead to "flags of convenience" with lack of regulatory con-
trol and social "dumping." The Panel concluded that a crite-
rion based on a combination of "principal place of business"
and "permanent residence" could be used to further broaden
the traditional ownership and control criteria, thereby provid-
ing a third option to those two involving groups of States which
had been adopted at the Conference. In the Panel's view, the
principal place of business/permanent residence criterion
would result in the firm link to the designating State, which
would not result in a degradation of safety, while meeting the
concerns expressed at the Conference. The Panel recom-
mended that States wishing to accept broadened criteria for air
carrier use of market access in their bilateral and multilateral air
services agreement agree to authorize market access for a desig-
nated air carrier which has its principal place of business and
permanent residence in the territory of the designating State
and has and maintains a strong link to the designating State.
In judging the existence of a strong link, States should take
into account elements such as the designated air carrier estab-
lishing itself, and having a substantial amount of its operations
and capital investment in physical facilities in the designating
State, paying income tax and registering its aircraft there, and
employing a significant number of nationals in managerial,
technical, and operational positions. Where a State believes it
requires conditions or exceptions concerning the use of the
principal place of business and permanent residence criterion
based on national security, strategic, economic or commercial
reasons this should be the subject of bilateral or multilateral ne-
gotiations or consultations, as appropriate. The above guide-
lines were approved by the Council on May 30, 1997 for the
guidance of States.
At the time of this writing, ICAO was receiving responses from
Contracting States to a questionnaire sent to them by the Organ-
ization seeking their views on and details of practices of owner-
ship and control of airlines in their territories. It will be
interesting to find out, once all responses are received, whether
States have veered toward more State control of air carriers, par-
ticularly in terms of the element of control a State would retain
in such areas as employment of trained public servants in ensur-
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ing security at airports and in the sky and overall government
share holding in airline companies. Trends in ownership and
control will be a critical issue to be addressed at the upcoming
ICAO 5th Air Transport Conference to be held in Montreal in
March 2003.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any investment in crisis management calculated to revive an
ailing aviation industry should be heavily weighted toward fund-
ing much needed management resources. On the insurance
side, a reinsurance pool, initiated by States and contributed to
by States would be a first step toward funding training and re-
source management. To strengthen aviation security, voluntary
contributions from all ICAO Contracting States form a practical
approach to buttressing regulatory management in both the
adoption of Standards and Recommended Practices and the
provision of aviation security training. In commercial aviation,
investment should be geared toward enhanced commercial co-
operation between carriers and the optimising and sharing of
existing resources such as aircraft fleets and slots for departure
and arrival.
There is no room for any doubt that in international civil avia-
tion management, international and domestic civil aviation
should not be considered in mutual exclusivity when it comes to
matters of security. The world community must establish a care-
fully synchronized and orchestrated plan of action and system of
progressing toward achieving substantial enforcement of avia-
tion security as a whole, and investment toward improving avia-
tion security should not be bifurcated into domestic and
international aviation. With regard to commercial implications,
the air transport industry has undergone a substantial metamor-
phosis following the recent attacks on America, not only
through the attacks themselves, but also through the portentous
threat against the liberalization of air transport and maximiza-
tion of commercial opportunity. Indeed, these new events have
given the air transport industry new perspective, and a new im-
petus to rethink aviation policy through cautious but visionary
regulation on the one hand and prudent economic policy on
the other.
On a more short term level, and of no less critical importance,
the aviation community must address the insurance and security
implications that have been slated for urgent discussion. Both
resolutions on insurance and security have called upon the
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ICAO to initiate work of an urgent nature. The working group
on insurance should make recommendations as to how States
can assist air transport operators and service providers in provid-
ing some financial protection. These actions would essentially
have to be implemented with full international accord and co-
operation. Implementation of these actions, through sustained
and experienced management, would require investments to be
carefully calculated toward obtaining the best available human
resources and other services.
It is also important that, in order to achieve the above men-
tioned management objectives, the aviation community should
start by attaining a full appreciation of the potential social and
economic advantages of restoring confidence in air travel world-
wide. The starting point should ineluctably be in the area of
regulatory management, where ICAO should be called upon to
identify and analyse new emerging and potential threats to civil
aviation and formulate appropriate practical strategy to address
the threats. Once threat identification is completed, effective
management follow through should involve modular applica-
tion of technological tools. Available technology, such as bio-
metric identification equipment and machine readable travel
document readers should be put to wider and more effective
use. Management databases containing personal information
relevant to ensuring safety should also be used extensively on
the basis that the international use of these databases in provid-
ing advance passenger information is essential as a preventive
management tool.
With regard to State responsibility, States should reaffirm
their responsibility for effective security management. They
should ensure integrated management, through partnerships
between aviation and other authorities, between government
and industry, spreading out to global, regional and inter re-
gional cooperation. Critical to this exercise would be the con-
duct by ICAO of aviation security audits, along the lines of
aviation safety audits already carried out by the Organization. 135
Procedures for assisting States in taking remedial action have to
be in place with the necessary follow up and technical assistance.
It is only then that investments made toward building an effec-
tive preventive security management system could be justified.
1-5 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Regulatory Management of Safety in Air Trans-
port, 4J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT 25-36 (1998).
648
2002] CRISIS MANAGEMENT 649
It is incontrovertible that responsibility for the provision of
security in municipal and international human activity lies
within the State which has control over that activity. In ensuring
aviation security, this responsibility devolves upon the State,
both through the public international law of treaties and
through other established legal principles as demonstrated ear-
lier in this article. Although there has been no explicit nexus
drawn between a requirement for a State to provide insurance
coverage for an activity in order that it may keep going, there is
certainly room for persuasive argumentation that airlines can-
not be expected to provide for insurance against war risks over
which they may not have sufficient control. As to how far States
are responsible to provide indemnities to air carriers against
grounding of aircraft owing to non existence of coverage, it is a
subject that needs qualification on a more empirical basis.
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